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 According to the traditional principle of UN 
peacekeeping operations, they should be 
deployed after ceasefire are reached in armed 
conflicts, and they should not be deployed 
“when violence flares” or “while war rages”. In 
these situations, should peacekeepers take the 
responsibility to protect the civilians there? 
The answer is “yes” in accordance with the 
current normative system in the international 
affairs.
 In the post-Cold War period, the international 
community has identified an overwhelming 
number of cases of war crimes and related 
human suffering, including brutal killing of 
civilians, torture, and sexual violence in the 
midst  o f  interna l  armed conf l ic t .  UN 
peacekeeping operations have been required to 
be the main and presumably the best solutions 
to the brutal conflicts. As a result, the concept 
and norm of “protection of civilians (POC)” and 
“Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” have 
emerged as  one  o f  the  e f for ts  o f  the 
international community to prevent such 
serious war crimes and human suffering. UN 
Introduction 
 In 2019, Severine Autesserre, professor at 
Columbia University, published an article, titled 
“The Crisis of Peacekeeping: Why the UN Can’t 
End Wars” in Foreign Affairs in its January 
and February issue of the year. In her article, 
she described:
Global leaders continue to call on “the blue 
helmets” as the go-to solution whenever 
violence flares in the developing world. U.S. 
President Barack Obama praised UN 
peacekeeping as “one of the world’s most 
important tools to address armed conflict”, 
and the UN itself claims that it has “helped 
end conflicts and foster reconciliation by 
conducting successful peacekeeping 
operation in dozens of countries”. But in 
fact, UN peacekeeping too often fail to meet 
their most basic objectives. On many 
deployments,  they end up watching 
helplessly while war rages.1)
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international humanitarian law (IHL), refugee 
law and human rights law. Under IHL, not only 
states but also non-state armed groups have 
obligations towards the protection of civilians. 
Humanitarian organizations including the UN 
and NGOs have a subsidiary role to press 
parties to an armed conflict to uphold their 
protective responsibilities and alleviate human 
suffering when parties to the conflict fail to do 
so.2) Therefore, POC has a legitimacy in the 
legal aspect.
 It was in February 1999 when the first 
debate on the protection of civilians was held 
in the UN Security Council, which then adopted 
a presidential statement expressing grave 
concern over the civilian toll of conflict 
casualties. Then the UN Secretary-General was 
requested by the Security Council to submit 
annual reports with recommendations on how 
it could improve both the physical and legal 
protection of civilians in situation of armed 
conflict.
 In 1999, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) was the first peacekeeping 
operation mandated to take the necessary 
action to afford protection to civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence. However, 
ten years after that first Security Council 
d e b a t e ,  t h e  U N  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l 
acknowledged that “further efforts  to 
strengthen POC remain crucial” in his report in 
May 2009. He also identified “human suffering 
owing to the fundamental failure of parties to 
conflict to fully respect and ensure respect for 
their obligations to prevent civilians.”3) He 
accepted that action on the ground have not 
peacekeeping operations have adopted such 
concept in their missions. In fact,  the 
application of POC and then R2P to the tasks 
o f  U N  p e a c e k e e p i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  w a s 
encouraged, as a result of independent 
inquiries into the failure to prevent the crime 
of ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and Srebrenica 
in 1994 and 1995, respectively.
 Therefore, even now, as Autesserre implies, 
it would not be compatible with such a current 
norm if UN peacekeepers “end up watching 
helplessly while war rages”, even if their main 
tasks are literally supposed to “keep the 
peace”. Meanwhile, more than two decades 
have passed since such a norm has been 
required to comply with in UN peacekeeping 
operations. One is wondering if it still has its 
efficacy, applicability and even legitimacy in UN 
peacekeeping if Autesserre’s argument is true.
 This paper will focus on the principle of POC 
and R2P in UN peacekeeping operations. One 
has identified a number of criticism and 
skepticism on the relation between the two. 
This article will address the question, “Is the 
relation still good enough?” as the title of this 
article puts it.
Protection of Civilians (POC) in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations- the cases of 
Sudan and the DRC
 Compared to R2P, POC is more legally based. 
According to the Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, the POC refers to 
measures that can be undertaken to ensure the 
safety of civilians during times of armed conflict 
and which are rooted in obligations under 
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within the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO). While many other 
organizations in Sudan that were engaged in 
the mission of “protection of civilians” existed, 
both internal and external to UN agencies, 
their view towards the mission of POC was 
different from that of UNMIS. For example, 
UNHCR in Sudan took a very long-term view of 
p ro tec t ion ,  f ocus ing  on  employment 
generation, and the delivery of services such as 
sanitation, education, and health care. While 
these issues were important, the approach was 
contradictory to that of UNMIS, which focused 
on short-term issues of physical security.6) The 
view of NGOs towards POC tended to be more 
similar to that of UNHCR than to that of 
UNMIS. Furthermore, even within UNMIS, 
there were a number of separate units 
dedicated to  POC,  inc luding those in 
Protection, Child Protection, and Human 
Rights, and each of them approached the issue 
with very different objectives in mind. However, 
in reality, there was no opportunity for the 
disparate organizations engaged in POC to 
meet, exchange, and share information, or 
discuss opportunities to enhance their own 
missions of POC.
 The second issue with POC in UNMIS was a 
lack of awareness of the mission mandate’s 
significance at the UN Security Council level, as 
well as among UNMIS personnel in the 
operational areas. Hitoshi Nasu claimed that 
the practice of POC in UN peacekeeping 
o p e r a t i o n s  d e v e l o p e d  w i t h o u t  m u c h 
deliberation in the Security Council. For 
example, in the Council debates, Canada and 
yet matched progress in words and the 
development of international norms and 
standard. The report pointed out five core 
challenges in conducting POC by external 
organizations, one of which was “enhancing 
protection through more effective and better 
resourced peacekeeping and other relevant 
missions.”4)
 Therefore, while the concept and norm of 
POC has a legitimacy with the viewpoint of 
international law, it can be argued if it has 
sufficient efficacy and applicability in the real 
missions of UN peacekeeping operations.
 In this context, the writer conducted the 
intensive research on POC in the United 
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).5) UNMIS 
was  establ ished on 24 March 2005 in 
accordance with Security Council Resolution 
1590 (2005), which mandate centred on 
helping to implement the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA ended the 
decade-long conflict between the Government 
of Sudan, based in the northern part of Sudan, 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/
Movement (SPLA/M), supported mainly by 
people from the southern part of Sudan. The 
mandate of UNMIS included humanitarian 
activities, such as promoting human rights and 
protecting civilians under imminent threat of 
violence.
 In fact, the extensive research on POC 
identified a number of issues in UNMIS. First, 
the interpretation and definition of POC in 
UNMIS was rather limited. In fact, as the official 
paper explained, UNMIS POC was not only a 
pilot unit, but also the only protection unit 
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UNMIS instructed its troops to “use force only 
when absolutely necessary to achieve your 
imminent aim, to protect yourself, your 
soldiers, UN or other designated personnel, 
installations, equipment and civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence.”10) 
Furthermore, the ROE authorized troops to 
“use force … to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence, when 
competent local authorities are not in a position 
to render immediate assistance. 11) The 
regulation of the use of force in the ROE was 
considered appropriate because of incidents 
occurring in Sudan during the UNMIS periods. 
Nevertheless, many argued that UNMIS should 
have been more proactive in POC. For 
example, the report of the Secretary-General in 
June 2006 stated that hundreds of UNMIS 
soldiers had been deployed to provide 
protection mainly to UN instal lat ions, 
personnel, military observers, and logistics 
staff, but not to civilians.12)
 In May 2008, UNMIS, in fact, faced a major 
challenge to its willingness to implement its 
POC mandate. Major conflicts between SPLA/
M and the forces of the Sudanese Government 
broke out on May 13, 2008 in Abyei. The entire 
population of 30,000 civilians was forced to 
flee, when irregular forces, a faction of 
Southern Sudanese, looted and burned civilian 
homes, including a village that was within 45 
meters of the UNMIS compound. After the 
civilians had fled, the UNMIS mission argued 
that it lacked a mandate to use force to protect 
civilian property. Meanwhile, US Special Envoy 
to Sudan, Richard Willliamson, criticized 
Japan were strong advocates of the concept of 
POC. The UK, the Netherlands, Argentina, 
N a m i b i a ,  R w a n d a ,  a n d  U g a n d a  a l s o 
enthusiastically supported the inclusion of POC 
i n  t h e  m a n d a t e  o f  U N  a n d  n o n - U N 
peacekeeping operations, for example, in 
ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, and MONUC. However, 
no other states provided any particular 
comment on the POC mandate in the Security 
Council. Of particular note was a lack of 
enthusiasm in the debate on POC with regard 
to its relevance with the mandate under 
Chapter VII of UN Charter.7)
 Likewise, at the field level, awareness or 
understanding of the mission’s civil ian 
protection responsibilities was also limited. In 
fact, some UNMIS personnel were entirely 
unaware of the Chapter VII component of the 
mandate. They believed that protecting 
civilians from tribal violence fell outside of the 
mission mandate, and was a distraction from its 
c o r e  b u s i n e s s  o f  s u p p o r t i n g  C PA 
implementation.8) They considered that the 
responsibility for POC lay with the government, 
particularly the police and other justice sector 
institutions that promote and defend the rule 
of law. POC activities by UNMIS, in their view, 
would result in negative consequences in 
UNMIS relations with the local people, since 
even the mere presence of international 
military peacekeepers tended to create 
expectations among the locals that they would 
be protected if violence should erupt.9)
 The third issue, closely related to the second, 
is a lack of proactive action by UNMIS 
personnel. The rule of engagement (ROE) of 
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Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in DRC. 
In fact, these three stabilization missions are 
amongst four largest UN operations currently 
deployed. In other words, the stabilizations 
forces whose major pillar of the mandate has 
the protection of civilians, deserves being 
researched for the analysis of POC in UN 
operations. In this sense, the writer conducted 
the research for MONUSCO in the DRC.
 MONUSCO was established in accordance 
with Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010) 
on 28 May 2010. “Stabilization” in MONUSCO 
meant stabilization through the protection and 
promotion of human rights and the promotion 
of democratization by means of the process of 
reliable elections. The purpose of the creation 
of MONUSCO was to build the state institution 
which creates security and justice systems and 
takes accountability for them. Its authorized 
size was the ceil ing of 19,815 mil itary 
personnel, with 760 military observers and staff 
officers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 formed 
police units.15)
 The protection of the Congolese civilians was 
a lso a  key element of  the mandate of 
MONUSCO. However, it was difficult to 
conclude that the protection of civilians in 
MONUSCO improved compared with one in the 
period of MONUC. The term of “stabilization” 
in MONUSCO was rather nominal. For example, 
from 30 July to 2 August 2010 one witnessed a 
huge scale of systematic rapes sacrificing at 
least 303 women in Walikale district in North 
Kivu province, which was located only 30 
kilometers from the MONUSCO base. In other 
UNMIS for failing to take more robust action to 
protect civilians in Abyei.13)
 In 2009, the POC Security Concept was 
developed by UNMIS Force HQ. However, the 
provisions in the Security Concept were not 
considered functional. According to the report 
of the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs (NUPI) on POC in Jonglei State in 
Sudan, there was little opportunity for 
proactive action because of the absence of 
clear operational instructions as to when and 
how to react to a situation of “imminent threat” 
against civilians. Therefore, the report argued, 
any level of commanders in UNMIS tended to 
simply follow instructions and orders from 
others.14)
 Thus, the case of UNMIS indicates several 
significant challenges in terms of the protection 
of civilians in UN peacekeeping operations. The 
issues of the protection of civilians were also 
identified at other UN operations in Africa. For 
example, currently, several UN operations are 
the so-called “stabilization forces”. In such 
forces, their mandate tasks them to contribute 
to restoring a maintaining order in a given 
situation, by protecting a government and its 
civilians against identified aggressors. They are, 
therefore,  tasked to undertake robust 
operations, based on Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. The examples of the stabilization 
forces  are  MINUSCA (United Nat ions 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in the Central African Republic) in 
C A R ,  M I N U S M A  ( U n i t e d  N a t i o n s 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in Mali) in Mali and MONUSCO (United 
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The FIB’s first engagement was the fight 
against the M23. Between July and November 
2013, when the FIB, alongside FARDC units, 
engaged by artillery, aerial attacks, snipers etc. 
The offensive measures led to the victory on 
the side of FARDC/FIB. 
 Meanwhile, several negative aspects on the 
FIB were also identified. For example, unlike 
other regular MONUSCO forces, the FIB was 
fighting against the anti-government armed 
groups with FARDC, and therefore was 
considered to be a party to the armed conflict. 
A problem is that many armed groups are 
unable to distinguish and separate the regular 
MONUSCO forces from the FIB. This situation 
raises two problems, from operational and legal 
viewpoints.  Operational ly,  the regular 
MONUSCO forces, which are less heavily 
armed, are more physically vulnerable to 
unexpected attacks from anti-government 
military factions. From the legal aspect, now 
MONUSCO including the FIB which lost 
impartiality, is regarded a party to the conflicts 
and will have lost the protections afforded to 
them under internat ional  law such as 
international humanitarian law (IHL), the 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations 
and Associated Personnel (SOFA), and the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Law.19)
 While the FIB and FARDC, to some extent”, 
implemented the mandates of neutralizing 
“several” armed groups, a number of major 
armed groups were still active, disrupting the 
local security and damaging “the Framework 
for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the 
words, MONUSCO could not prevent nor stop 
the systematic rapes conducted by armed 
factions.
 In November 2012, one witnessed the brutal 
occupation of Goma, the capital of North Kivu 
province in the eastern DRC, by the M23, the 
Tutsi-led anti-government armed group.16) 
MONUSCO was seriously criticized for its 
ineffective response in preventing the 
onslaught.
 On 24 February 2013, “the Framework for 
Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC 
and the Region” was signed by regional powers, 
which offered a comprehensive approach to 
the problem. The framework proposed a 
heavily-armed combat operations commanded 
by the UN. This framework, which the African 
Union assisted to put together, was signed in 
Ethiopian by leaders from the DRC, Angola, 
Burundi, the Central African Republic, Rwanda, 
South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda 
and Zambia. It was signed in the presence of 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who acted 
as one of the generators.17) Thus, the Force 
Intervention Brigade (FIB) was established by 
UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013) of 
18 March 2013. Its mandate included using all 
necessary means to “neutralize” armed groups 
which permitted it to use force, including 
deadly force.18) The FIB, with 3,069 troops”, 
was led by Tanzanian general, and consisted of 
three infantry battalions, one artillery unit, one 
Special Forces unit and a reconnaissance 
company. 
 In  fact ,  the  FIB contr ibuted to  the 
stabilization of the eastern part of the DRC. 
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limited mandate of neutralizing the armed 
groups in the limited areas for the short term, 
it is questionable that it will contribute to 
sustainable peace and protect civilians in the 
DRC.
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations 
 L ike  POC,  R2P i s  a l so  a  normat ive 
commitment initiated by the international 
community. It was initiated by UN member 
states in 2005 at the UN World Summit, 
consisting 3 pillars: Pillar I) every state has the 
Responsibility to Protect its populations from 
four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
c leansing;  I I)  the wider  internat ional 
community has the responsibility to encourage 
and assist individual states in meeting that 
responsibility; and III) if a state is manifestly 
fa i l ing to protect  i ts  populat ions,  the 
international community must be prepared to 
take appropriate collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner and in accordance with 
the UN Charter.
 The difference of POC and R2P is that 
“protection” in POC is literally categorized as 
an “activity itself”, whereas “responsibility” in 
R2P is a “attitude” towards the activity. 
Therefore, the norm of R2P should be initiated 
first, and POC is its implementing phase. 
Therefore, the term of R2P is not stated in UN 
mandates. R2P also emphasizes the prevention 
of atrocity crimes through action that 
reinforces good governance, strengthens 
mechanism for human rights protection, and 
DRC and the Region”. In fact, ADF was still 
brutal, targeting a number of innocent civilians. 
According to the Secretary-General’s report on 
30 December 2014, in two months since 
October 2014 attacks attributed to ADF 
resulted in the killing of over 250 civilians.20) 
This figure increased to 347 in his report 26 
June 2015. On 5 May 2015, a group of 
suspected elements ambushed a MONUSCO 
patrol between Oicha and Eringeti, killing two 
Tanzanian peacekeepers.21) Meanwhile, FDLR22) 
continued committing human rights abuse 
against the civilian population. In North Kivu 
province, following operation Sukoda II 
conducted by FARDC against FDLR, 162 
e lements  had  been  captured ,  62  had 
surrendered and 13 had been killed. Despite 
this progress, the command and control 
structures of the group remained largely 
i n tac t . 23 ) Some  o f  the  FDLR f i gh te r s 
participated in the UN-led disarmament, 
demobilisation, repatriation and rehabilitation 
(DDRR) programs. However, most of their 
fighters and weapons remain at large, and this 
small gesture may be taken by the MONUSCO 
as a sign of sufficient gesture. Furthermore, 
MONUSCO and FIB was criticized of their 
reluctance of going after the FDLR as 
aggressively as it pursued the M23. Thus, the 
impartiality of FIB had been questioned. Above 
all, according to the impression of South 
Afr ican journal ist  who ta lked to non-
government people in the region, the FIB had 
not done very much for nearly a year since its 
establishment.24)
 Thus, while the FIB was effective in the 
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demonstrated a newly found determination to 
act on R2P. In fact, the Security Council 
invoked the norm of R2P three times more 
frequently in the three years after the so-called 
“Arab’s Spring” in Libya.
 Meanwhile, it is to be noted that all of three 
pillars have not been equally supported by the 
international community. The views of the 
pillars have been manifestly divided among the 
permanent members (P5) in the Security 
Council: 
…indicatively, during the seminal 2009 
General Assembly debate on R2P, China 
s ta ted ,  ‘ the  implementa t ion  o f  the 
responsibili ty to protect  should not 
contravene the principle of state sovereignty 
and the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of States.’ Likewise in its 
statement to the Security Council after the 
adoption of Resolution 1973 on Libya, the 
Chinese ambassador noted, ‘China is always 
against the use of force in international 
relations’. Clearly this very restricted 
interpretation of R2P does not equate with 
the ethos of Pillar III which was obviously 
designed to legitimize external involvement 
in the affairs of sovereign states, including, 
in very extreme cases, coercive military 
intervention.27)
 In fact, on R2P, there is the chasm of opinion 
between Global North and Global South, 
especially the group of 77 (G-77) countries, as 
wel l  as  China and Russia,  which have 
r e e m p h a s i z e d  t h e  p r i m a c y  o f  s t a t e 
generates  cooperat ion among diverse 
communities. POC generally requires host state 
consent, while R2P does not require the host 
state consent, but requires authorization by the 
UN Security Council, in keeping with the UN 
Charter.
 Furthermore, Touko Piiparinen argued that 
R2P entails not only the limited objective of the 
protection of civilians from the immediate 
physical threat of mass atrocity crimes, but 
also, and more crucially, wider and ambitious 
transformative interventions aimed at changing 
the conditions and structures of target states 
and societies, sometime even contributing to 
regime change.25)
 In fact, R2P has provided several positive 
effects on UN peacekeeping operations. Alex 
Bellamy argued that there is a positive 
connection between the use of the term of R2P 
by government, the UN and NGOs and the 
possibility of the Security Council to pass the 
same issue.:
In a little over half (53%) of the cases of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity where 
RtoP was invoked by any actor, the Security 
Council adopted resolutions in relation to 
that crisis. This compares with only 14% of 
cases where RtoP was not invoked. At face 
value, this suggests that the Council is more 
likely to adopt measures when a situation is 
framed in RtoP terms than in relation to 
similar events that are not so framed.26)
 Thus, Bellamy stated in 2015 that Security 
Council ’s record in the past f ive years 
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Sudan as well as Mali, Chad, and Northern 
Nigeria.32) From the totally opposite viewpoints, 
states might exploit humanitarian pretexts, 
abusing R2P in pursuit of other strategic 
ends.33)
 Selectiveness of R2P was repeated by 
Abiodun Williams in 2017. He argued that 
international engagement to prevent or halt 
R2P would remain conditional on a number of 
variables, including the complexity of the 
situation, the risks involved, the potential for 
success, the international political and financial 
climate, and the geopolitical importance of the 
country.34)
 How has the practicability of R2P in UN 
peacekeeping been? As Thomas Weiss put it, 
“The main challenge facing the responsibility to 
protect is how to act, not how to build 
normative consensus”. In this context, Edward 
C. Luck argued that R2P’s first decade clearly 
had produced more questions than answers, 
and that they were the kind of second-
generation questions that speak to how far R2P 
has come along the road from theory to 
practice.35)
 In this context, one academia said that the 
project of R2P is making little difference in 
situation of mass violence, and another 
suggested a more bottom-up approach. 
However, theoretically R2P generally accepts 
military intervention as a main measure against 
mass violence and therefore its top-down 
approach is inevitable. Therefore, this 
argument would be a dilemma of R2P. 
 Thus, many academic figures pointed out the 
structural and organizational defects which 
sovereignty.28) This fact implies a significant 
impact on UN peacekeeping operations since 
the vast majority of troop contributing states to 
UN peacekeeping operations are from Global 
South as well as China.
 In fact, as Charles Cater and David Malone 
pointed out, while R2P remains a useful 
principle in the Security Council, its use will 
continue to depend very much on relationship 
among the major powers and their analysis of 
complex situations on the ground.29) Aidan 
Hehir’s view on the causal factors on “an R2P 
action” in Libya is more radical:  
… it has also been noted that the causal 
factors which led to the decision to intervene 
were not related to R2P; these include the 
unique unpopularity of Gaddafi, the 
proximity of Libya to mainland Europe, 
Libya’s oil reserves, and most particularly, 
the statement made by the Arab League on 
12 March 2011 calling for military action 
against Libya. This statement convinced the 
US to support action, and Russia and China 
not to oppose it.30)
 Likewise, Graham Harrison conducted 
research on international involvement in 
Kenya’s election, suggesting that influence has 
not been in new R2P agendas but iterations of 
long-standing ones in which regional geopolitics 
is a major concern and the US and EU have 
been preponderant agencies following their 
own familiar approaches.31) Harrison warned 
the complete absence of any related R2P 
project in the growing mass violence in South 
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operations. The conclusion will be as follows.
 In terms of POC, the cases of Sudan and the 
DRC exemplified several significant issues and 
challenges in the tasks of the protection of 
civilians in UN peacekeeping operations. 
Presumably, both of the case convinces of the 
problem of “filling the gap”. That is, one needed 
to fill the gap in the definition of POC between 
the UN and non-UN agencies, and between 
military and civilian staff within the UN. One 
also suffers from the failure of filling the gap in 
the attitude towards robustness in the 
operations between FIB and normal MONUSCO 
forces. Meanwhile, both UNMIS in Sudan and 
MONUSCO in the DRC had the common issues 
of lack of proactive actions. Currently, eight out 
of fourteen UN peacekeeping operations still 
have POC at the core of their mandates, which 
means that 96% of deployed peacekeepers are 
currently tasked with protecting civilians as 
p a r t  o f  t h e i r  m i s s i o n  o b j e c t i v e s . 3 7 ) 
Mainstreaming the principle of the protection 
of civilians still seeks further improvement to 
tackle the above issues. 
 Meanwhile, the issues of R2P is rather 
organizational and political than operational. In 
fact, the term of R2P itself has played an 
effective and influential role in the debates on 
the issues of war criminals in Security Council. 
However, there is lack of consensus in terms of 
how far they should pursuit the principle of 
R2P among the great powers, especially P5. 
While R2P was absent in several UN operations, 
it was abused for some great powers’ political 
and strategical purposes. The nature of 
selectiveness was clearly identified in the 
R2P as well as POC has as the newly emerging 
principles and projects. Meanwhile, in the 
empirical operational field of UN peacekeeping 
operations, many soldiers and officers have had 
the different viewpoints. For example, when 
the author conducted the field research to the 
United National Interim Forces in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) in August 2019, all of the soldiers and 
officers in UNIFIL have considered the 
protection of civilians as essential. In the 
research, Colonel Byern in the Irish Defence 
Forces, who was the Deputy Commanding 
Officer of Sector West of UNIFIL criticized the 
so-called “Cruz Report” which was published as 
the UN official report which focused on how to 
reduce the number of UN casualties, saying:
The essence of UN peacekeeping operations 
is not the protection of UN personnel, but 
the protection of local people. Therefore, it 
is essential that peacekeepers take the 
responsibility to protect local people.36)
 UNIFIL has been well-known as the mission 
with the UN mandate of Chapter VI. Like 
Colonel Byern, many Irish soldiers and offices 
whom I had an interview with mentioned that 
humanitarian activities are important tasks in 
U N I F I L .  I n  s u c h  t a s k s ,  t h e  s e n s e  o f 
responsibility to protect civilians has been 
essentially taken for granted by them.
Conclusion
 This paper dealt  with two emerging 
humanitarian norms, the Protection of Civilians 
and the Responsibility to Protect in UN 
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project of R2P. The top-down approach of R2P 
was also pointed out.
 On the whole, the principles of POC and R2P 
were advocated with significant enthusiasm 
and ambition for the purpose of saving 
vulnerable people in war-torn situations. Both 
of them win the absolute legitimacy with the 
viewpoint of liberalism and humanitarianism. 
However, this paper indicated a number of 
issues to be tackled after about two decades of 
their establishment. This is not to say, POC and 
R2P should not have been advocated. Rather, 
they should be reassessed, modified and 
improved.
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